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‘Phrases make history here’: Churchill, Ireland and the rhetoric of Empire

This article examines the imperial dimension of Winston Churchill’s rhetoric on Ireland over the course of his entire career. Whereas previous discussions of Churchill and the Irish question have tended to focus on whether he was sincere or opportunistic, his views are treated here in the context of the rhetorical environment in which he was operating. It is shown that, in his Edwardian Liberal phase, his argument that Home Rule would strengthen the Empire was part of a pre-existing Liberal and Nationalist discourse. He refashioned these arguments in order to sell the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921-2, but they were later turned against him by Conservative colleagues when he opposed the Statute of Westminster, and the imperial dimension of his Irish rhetoric weakened thereafter. However, certain themes, such as his praise of Irish military heroism, remained constant. It is argued that rhetorical analysis is a valuable but neglected tool for Irish and imperial historians.

The problem of Ireland’s relationship to the British Empire has been the cause for much historical debate.​[1]​ The ambivalence of its position was in part the product of the different uses that ‘the Irish question’ was put within British domestic politics. As Andrew Thompson has noted, ‘the terms “empire” and “imperialism” were like empty boxes that were continuously being filled up and emptied of their meanings.’​[2]​ Ireland – and its position within the Empire - likewise served a wide range of rhetorical functions according to the speaker, the audience addressed, and the immediate political context. Rhetorical analysis, therefore, is a potentially valuable (but hitherto neglected) tool for addressing the vexed issue of Ireland’s imperial standing. The rhetoric of Winston Churchill is a useful place to begin. Starting his career as a vociferous Tory opponent of Home Rule, his shift to the Liberal Party in 1904 required him to finesse his position considerably. As Ireland advanced once more to the forefront of British politics, Churchill emerged as a champion of Home Rule – but also as an early advocate of partition. As Secretary of State for War during the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1919-21 he pursued repressive policies against the rebels, but then, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, played a significant role in the treaty negotiations that followed. By the early 1930s he had reinvented himself once more as a Tory Diehard and sought to restrict the application of the Statute of Westminster as it applied to Ireland. His wartime conflicts with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera, which culminated in a verbal spat over the airwaves in 1945, are well known. Nonetheless, after World War II Churchill continued to advocate Irish unification. Thus, by the end of his career he had almost – but not quite - run through the gamut of positions on Ireland that it was possible for a mainstream Westminster politician to hold. Consideration of Churchill’s rhetoric on the issue allows us to examine a wide variety of the (highly contested) uses to which ‘Empire’ could be put in the context of the British debate about Ireland in the first part of the Twentieth Century. 

Churchill’s many biographers have dealt with his involvement with Ireland in considerable detail. There have also been a number of more specialized treatments.​[3]​ Although John Ramsden has widened the field of enquiry by looking at Churchill’s reception by the Irish, most historians have focused on the detail of Churchill’s policy involvement.​[4]​ Interpretations of his motives vary, as can be seen in the debate over his role in the Home Rule controversy in the years before 1914. Andrew R. Muldoon argues that Churchill supported Home Rule for reasons of state, and that his devotion to it ‘grew solely from motives of imperial patriotism, to strengthen Britain and its Empire in the world.’​[5]​ Ian Chambers counters that Churchill was an opportunist whose support for Home Rule was ‘an aberration’ brought on by his desire to advance himself politically.​[6]​ This article does not aim to arbitrate between these positions, as it is not primarily concerned with the biographical question of whether Churchill’s views were sincere or otherwise. Rather, it seeks to place those views in the context of arguments made by Churchill’s contemporaries. It aims to illuminate the debates that took place about Ireland and the Empire, with reference to the rhetorical environment in which Churchill was operating and the role that imperial language played within it. Ronald Hyam has suggested that Churchill ‘was not all that interested in the empire, apart from its rhetorical potentialities, and as distinct from what he regarded as the larger and more portentous issues of international relations’.​[7]​ Yet if we want to understand fully how he and his contemporaries attempted to sell their views on Ireland to the British and Irish publics (and to their fellow politicians), then the ‘rhetorical potentialities’ of Empire are exactly what we need to consider. In particular, we need to understand the ‘context of refutation’ – that is, in this case, the Empire-related arguments that Home Rulers were attacking and seeking to rebut.​[8]​

In this article, ‘rhetoric’ denotes discourse in its spoken form.​[9]​ Churchill was, of course, a prolific author who often wrote about Ireland. Minor discrepancies aside, the ideological content of these writings is not at variance with that of his speeches and broadcasts; so what, it may be asked, is the value of focusing on the latter category in particular? Part of the answer is simply that Churchill’s speeches on Ireland often became the subject of intense political controversy – sometimes even before they were given – in a way that his written texts about it generally did not. Over and above this, however, the significance of spoken rhetoric comes from the part it plays in the ‘symbolic ritual dimension of politics’, as Alan Finlayson and James Martin have put it.​[10]​ (This naturally applies more to speeches at public meetings than to broadcasts.) The direct interaction which occurs when a speaker addresses an audience face-to-face is frequently significant both in influencing the course of events and in revealing the preoccupations of those present. It is important, therefore, to be aware not only of the words spoken but also of the politics of gesture, the competition for dominance of political space, and the construction of ‘image events’ for wider public consumption.​[11]​ (All of these phenomena can be seen at work, for example, in Churchill’s 1912 Belfast speech, discussed below.)  As J.G.A. Pocock explains, the process of the ‘creation and diffusion of languages’ must be seen as occurring not only ‘within the activity of discourse’ but also ‘in the interactions between discourse and other social phenomena.’​[12]​ Examining the production and reception of rhetoric in our sense, then, provides us a window on the creation and diffusion of imperial language, the ‘imperial’ quality of which was often derived from its setting as well as its content.  We are still left with the paradox, though, that just as Churchill tended to write his speeches and dictate his books, his rhetoric, in days before his radio addresses of 1940, was more widely read than it was heard. Mediated through newspaper accounts, the physicality and drama of his rhetoric was ‘read’ remotely by far greater numbers than were able witness it first-hand.





The Churchill family’s longstanding involvement in Ireland is well known.​[21]​ From the rhetorical point of view, Winston Churchill had to contend with the heavy legacy of comments made by his father, Lord Randolph Churchill, during the crisis of 1886. In a notorious speech at the Ulster Hall in Belfast, Lord Randolph argued that Loyalists in Ireland might have to resort to violence in order to resist subjection to a Home Rule parliament in Dublin. A few days later, in a public letter, he used the phrase ‘Ulster will fight, Ulster will be right’.​[22]​ This remark remained a touchstone of popular memory into the Edwardian period and beyond. However, Lord Randolph’s position was one of the few available that the younger Churchill never espoused himself. He never supported the coercion of Ulster (although he was suspected of doing so in 1914); but equally, he never suggested that it would be acceptable for the people of Ulster to resist Home Rule through violent means. Lord Randolph used the standard argument, also deployed by Lord Salisbury and others, that Home Rule would ‘shatter the British Empire’.​[23]​ Gladstone and other Home Rulers – using a type of argument that had already been used in nationalist circles - made the case that, in fact, it would strengthen the Empire.​[24]​ Winston Churchill would echo the former argument in the first stages of his career and the latter after he had joined the Liberals. 

In the run-up to his first parliamentary election campaign in 1899, Winston Churchill claimed that Liberal policies would lead to ‘the heart of the empire’ being ‘riven in twain by the old ridiculous measure of Home Rule.’​[25]​ (As Stephen Howe points out, this type of claim, which was very common, portrayed Home Rule as a threat to the British state and society as a whole; Ireland was not being viewed in the same terms as more distant Empire territories.)​[26]​ Raising the issue of Home Rule was an effective means of highlighting Liberal divisions; the impending conflict in South Africa was about to split the party into ‘Liberal Imperialist’ and ‘pro-Boer’ factions, with leader Henry Campbell-Bannerman struggling to hold it together from the centre ground.​[27]​ For the Tories, meanwhile, as Daniel Jackson has noted, ‘the defence of the union was an issue that was coincidentally a vote winner and an ancient and fundamental Conservative totem.’​[28]​ 

Although Churchill lost the by-election, he was comfortably elected at the general election of 1900, following his exploits in the Boer War. Before taking his seat he embarked on lengthy lecture tours at home and in the USA. He did this mainly for the money, and his listeners came mainly for the entertainment, but his lectures, which were illustrated by magic lantern, also had a didactic purpose and were laden with imperial symbolism. In Belfast, the ‘huge screen’ on which his slides were projected ‘had been artistically draped with Union Jacks, presenting a charming effect.’ Churchill concluded his talk on this occasion ‘by hoping that the memories of the indomitable courage and bravery of Christian De Wet and the skill of General [Piet] Joubert [both Boer leaders] would in the future be themselves amongst the forces that support the Union Jack as it waves over a free and united South Africa.’ This was his standard finale, but the sub-text for a Belfast audience was obvious: Ireland too could be reconciled to the flag. In the exchange of pleasantries that rounded off the meeting he said that he thought that public interest in the war ‘showed that the people of Belfast, in common with the rest of the United Kingdom, had at last become alive to the value and importance of our colonies and over-sea possessions’.​[29]​ Churchill’s next stop was Dublin, where he tailored his message to the audience, praising the bravery of the Dublin Fusiliers in South Africa, reminiscing about his childhood days in the city, and suggesting that ‘the perplexing problems of Irish politics’ were now nearer solution than they had been then.​[30]​ His reception was gratifying, with even the nationalist press giving grudging acknowledgment of his skill as a speaker, although the Freeman’s Journal considered the lecture to be in ‘gross bad taste’.​[31]​ Churchill’s Irish lectures had advanced no specific policy agenda; he had instead taken the role of imperial educator, trying to bring home to the Irish people the value of Britain’s overseas possessions. In the Commons, however, his praise of the courage of Irish soldiers took on overtly political edge. In his maiden Commons speech he made play with it to suggest that the Nationalist Party’s opposition to the war was unrepresentative: ‘It is wonderful that hon. Members who form the Irish party should find it in their hearts to speak and act as they do in regard to a war in which so much has been accomplished by the courage, the sacrifices, and, above all, by the military capacity of Irishmen.’​[32]​ 





Having taken the Liberal whip, Churchill remained a declared opponent of a separate parliament, although he did support a more modest delegation of powers under the label ‘administrative Home Rule’. This, he hoped, would lead Ireland to a position where it was no longer ‘a source of danger and weakness to the Empire.’​[34]​ His position meant that he and his new colleagues had to engage in some nimble rhetorical footwork.​[35]​ Liberals continued to view Churchill with suspicion on account of his attitude to Home Rule; and when a speech by Lord Rosebery threatened to bring the issue back to the forefront of politics, at the very point when the Liberals were about to return to office, Churchill feared that he would be put ‘in an awful hole’.​[36]​ After 1906, however, he progressively accommodated himself to the mainstream Liberal position on Ireland. As a junior minister at the Colonial Office, he played an important role in devising self-government for the former Boer Republics in South Africa, and this led him to draw overt analogies with the Irish. He told a meeting in May 1907 that room had been found within the Empire for the French-Canadians and South African Dutch, and that he thought the day ‘was inscribed in the book of fate when Ireland too will be brought into the circle of the British Empire in spirit as well as in name.’​[37]​ Although Churchill was not yet explicitly committed to Home Rule - that came in 1908 during his by-election campaign in Manchester, where the Irish vote was influential​[38]​ - he nonetheless tried to invert the traditional Unionist argument that increased freedom for Ireland would strike a blow at the heart of Empire. Ireland in its current discontented state, he claimed, posed a risk to the Empire; addressing Irish grievances would increase the Empire’s spiritual strength.

After 1910, the Nationalists held the balance in the Commons and were thus in a good position to enforce their demands, but a Home Rule bill did not emerge until 1912. In the months before its publication, Churchill began to develop his arguments about Ireland and the Empire more systematically than before. Muldoon is quite right to draw attention to the importance of Churchill’s statements, but he fails to put them in context.​[39]​  They need to be understood as part of a political and rhetorical strategy to which Churchill contributed but which he did not invent. For example, in 1911, Jeremiah MacVeagh, Nationalist MP for South Down and ‘pamphleteer-in-chief to his party’, published Home Rule in a Nutshell. By April the following year this penny booklet had sold 250,000 copies.​[40]​ It was partly intended to serve as a primer for speakers; MacVeagh himself was an effective orator for the Home Rule Council (which Churchill chaired).​[41]​ MacVeagh claimed that Britain’s self-governing colonies all supported Irish Home Rule, and that Home Rule would strengthen the Empire.​[42]​  Similar arguments can be found in much other contemporary literature and, as far as Empire opinion went, had some basis in fact, although there was a strong tendency for domestic supporters of Home Rule to oversimplify the case.​[43]​ In view of the vexed ‘Was Ireland a colony?’ debate it is worth remembering that contemporary Nationalists argued that the Irish ought to be treated in the same way as the white populations of Britain’s ‘self-governing’ colonies and that this was being denied to them unfairly. In a sense, then, they aspired to colonial status. Furthermore, when faced with actual proposed legislation, leading Unionists argued (doubtless opportunistically) that ‘if there is to be Home Rule they would prefer the real measure on Colonial lines’ rather than the halfway house or ‘hybrid monstrosity’ that they claimed was in fact being offered.​[44]​

The Daily Chronicle swiftly republished MacVeagh’s booklet with an introduction by Churchill.​[45]​ This argued that Home Rule would gratify not only the self-governing Dominions but also opinion in the United States, which led him to make an early reference to his well-known theme of ‘the unity of the English-speaking peoples’.​[46]​  (Again, the claim that Home Rule would strengthen the Empire by improving Anglo-American relations was not unique to Churchill.)​[47]​ MacVeagh’s pamphlet generated a rebuttal by ‘An Irish Unionist’; and Sir Edward Carson and Andrew Bonar Law ridiculed the preface in their speeches. Law invoked memories of the South African conflict, rejected ‘the analogy of the Colonies’, and raised the spectre of a Home Rule parliament sending messages of goodwill to Britain’s enemies in the case of a future war.​[48]​ Variants of the Churchill-MacVeagh line were to be found in the speeches of Asquith, Grey and Lloyd George and many others around this time.​[49]​ As John Redmond noted in 1913, ‘every Home Rule speaker insists to-day, upon the colonial analogy.’​[50]​  We may surmise that Home Rule supporters invoked imperial arguments at least partly because they wanted to occupy ground on which they knew their opponents would fight. 

In February 1912, Churchill and John Redmond addressed a joint meeting in Belfast, a move that many unionists portrayed as a calculated insult to their community. It was initially planned that the meeting should take place in the Ulster Hall, where Lord Randolph had spoken in 1886. Carson said that ‘the most provocative speaker in the whole Party, is going under the most provocative circumstances to a place where the words of his own father are still ringing in the ear’, and went on to describe Churchill as a ‘turncoat’.​[51]​ In the event, Churchill was forced to switch venue, although the fact that he was able to hold the meeting at all could be claimed as a success. In his speech, Churchill suggested that an Irish Parliament would be ‘an enrichment and an added glory to the treasures of the British Empire’. As in his preface to the MacVeagh pamphlet, he hinted that Home Rule should be implemented as part of a wider scheme of imperial federation. (Later in the year, encouraged by members of the imperialist Round Table group, Churchill would develop this theme further.)​[52]​  From the rhetorical point of view this had the advantage of undercutting the idea that the Irish were to receive special treatment denied to others, and also exploited the fact that some Tories had themselves preached federation in the past. Much of Churchill’s rhetoric was directed to Ulster Protestants. (A number of protestants who supported Home Rule were present in the audience, an important symbol of the meeting’s non-sectarian character.) He said that he hoped that his imperial arguments would hold at least as much weight with this group as religious concerns did, and, at the same time as he warned them against allowing themselves to be used as a cat’s-paw of the Tories, he also stressed the safeguards against religious oppression that would be built into the Home Rule legislation. In his conclusion he turned his father’s slogan on its head, appealing to the people of Ulster to ‘fight for the unity and consolidation of the British Empire’ and ‘for the spread of charity, tolerance, and enlightenment.’ If they would do this, he said ‘Then indeed “Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right.”’ Redmond followed, saying that Churchill seemed specially destined ‘to bear a large part in what he might call saving Ireland to the Empire.’ By saying that he accepted ‘every word’ of Churchill’s speech, Redmond signaled that he himself believed that Ireland’s future did indeed lie within the Empire.​[53]​ 

Redmond, who can be seen as falling within the ‘Catholic loyalist’ tradition, had been making imperial arguments for Home Rule for many years.​[54]​ Although some in his party shared his position, the support for it was not strong, and his conciliatory tone was shared only by a minority of nationalists, many of whom had a continuing affection for the physical force tradition. In addition, his formal style of classical rhetoric, which lacked the force of Carson’s oratory, may have put him at some distance from his supporters.​[55]​ But whether or not Churchill and Redmond on this occasion coordinated the content of their speeches in advance, they, at least, were singing from the same hymn-sheet.

There were at this time a number of ‘Unionist Home Rulers’ who adopted a similar line to Redmond and Churchill.​[56]​ On the whole, though, their pleas for conciliation fell on stony ground. In the febrile atmosphere, this was unsurprising, but it may be that Churchill’s basically secular – albeit somewhat mystical – imperial vision failed to appeal to those for whom the Empire was an essentially protestant concern.​[57]​ Perhaps more importantly, many Unionists simply did not believe Nationalist protestations of imperial loyalty, which were felt to be incompatible with, for example, support for the Irish language movement.​[58]​  ‘Mr. Churchill was really eloquent when he spoke of the storming of the Tugela Heights and the Relief of Ladysmith’, said Carson. (Churchill had again praised the bravery of Irish soldiers.) ‘I think he must have forgotten that he was speaking in the presence of men who publicly prayed in the British House of Commons that success might attend the Boer arms.’​[59]​ Redmond, of course, was proceeding on the understanding that a Home Rule Ireland would be a united Ireland. Churchill, together with Lloyd George, now privately recognized that Ulster – often described as ‘the Imperial Province’ - would require special treatment.​[60]​ In July 1912, Bonar Law warned that ‘I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which I shall not be ready to support them’.​[61]​ Churchill publicly suggested that Law’s logic could be used to justify ‘every lawless or disruptive movement in any part of the Empire’.​[62]​ 

In response, a wide range of Empire-related arguments were deployed by anti-Home Rulers. Some chose to cast doubt on the patriotic protestations of Redmond and his followers, others said that pro-Home Rule sentiment in other parts of the Empire such as Canada was not as strong as was often claimed, and yet others suggested that the government was itself attempting to compel the loyal people of Ulster to leave the Empire and to thrust them under the domination of the disloyal. (Churchill’s anti-Home Rule comments from his Tory days were also thrown back at him.)​[63]​ Churchill’s charge of disloyalty, however, was a powerful one, as it struck at the heart of the credentials that the Ulster Unionists claimed for themselves. The true course of loyalty, he urged in February 1913, would be for the Ulster resisters to swallow their ‘unfounded fears’ and accept, with all necessary reassurances, the majority will: ‘Half a province cannot claim to stand for all time in the way not only of the demands of a nation but of the needs of an Empire.’​[64]​ Carson’s means of tackling such criticisms (which his preparations to establish a provisional government in Ulster strongly invited) was to cast resistance to the current Westminster government as a way to keep the province ‘in trust for the Empire and under the King.’​[65]​

Of course, few at the time were inclined to take their opponents’ arguments about Ireland and Empire at face value. When Churchill introduced the second reading of the Home Rule Bill with a notably moderate speech a sceptical leader in the Yorkshire Post suggested that ‘Ministers are posing as restrained, thoughtful, high-minded statesmen, with a great mission of imperial reconstruction’. Churchill, it argued, was going along with this game at the expense of his natural instinct for provocative rhetoric.​[66]​ Moreover, although speeches were aimed at winning votes in parliament and at securing the support of the electorate in general, these were not their only purposes. Liberals, Conservatives and Nationalists all used oratory (in parallel with private negotiations) as a form of public diplomacy. The functions of rhetoric were many: to reassure allies or to try to keep them in line, to intimidate opponents or to hold out the chance of compromise, to float initiatives or to paper over intra-party divisions. Churchill had a reputation for taking an independent line and made use of this to air in public positions to which Asquith and other ministers did not yet care to commit themselves. In particular, he raised the possibility of special treatment for Ulster, an opportunity some Opposition leaders were keen to exploit.​[67]​ Redmond, however, was obliged to repudiate the idea. ​[68]​

Churchill did sometimes resort to intemperate language. In a conversation with Austen Chamberlain, Churchill explained that he did so in order to bring a deal nearer. Chamberlain recorded Churchill’s views as follows:

Public opinion had got to have a shock. Both sides had to make speeches full of party claptrap & no surrender & then insert a few sentences at the end for wise & discerning people on the other side to see & ponder. ‘A little red-blood had got to flow’ & then public opinion would wake up & then ---! ‘And you must remember that we think that time is on our side. We shall give no provocation. The Ulstermen will have no excuse, & we think that public opinion will not support them if they wantonly attack.’​[69]​





At the start of the war, the Home Rule Bill was placed upon the statute book with its operation suspended for the duration. The Irish Parliamentary Party was not yet in terminal decline, but the new generation of Nationalists that emerged with the 1916 rising – at which point Churchill was temporarily out of office – blamed Redmond for his support for the war and, unlike him, saw no future for Ireland within the Empire. As Michael Wheatley observes, ‘Redmond’s moderate, conservative vision […] of Home Rule peacefully and constitutionally achieved within the British empire, simply could not be realized.’​[73]​  As Secretary of State for War during the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1919-21 Churchill was closely involved in the efforts to suppress the IRA and was also very much aware of new rebellious movements elsewhere in the Empire. In addition, he was a vociferous supporter of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia. In this context it is not surprising that his rhetoric now identified Irish nationalism as a mortal threat to the Empire, not something that could be accommodated within it. In November 1920, echoing Carson, he claimed that that Lenin, Sinn Féin and Indian and Egyptian extremists were all linked in ‘a world-wide conspiracy’ to overthrow the Empire.​[74]​ Although there is no evidence that Churchill harboured any sectarian prejudices himself, it is possible that some listeners would have been reminded of the familiar allegation that Home Rule was part of a ‘popish plot’. (Churchill’s remarks were quickly echoed in turn by Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary to Ireland, and were also shared by Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.)​[75]​ But when the government concluded that force had failed and agreed a truce with the Irish rebel leaders, he and his colleagues had to justify their about-turn. In a speech in September 1921 – he was now Colonial Secretary – Churchill argued that ‘the main interests of the British Empire’ would be ‘greatly furthered’ by a lasting Irish peace. He now put a very different spin on the pre-war ‘loyalty’ argument, saying that the Northern Irish could not be accused of frustrating the wishes of the Irish majority given that they had accepted (under the 1920 Government of Ireland Act) ‘great changes in her status in order to conform to what she believes is in the interest of the British Empire’. There was, however, a key which the Southern Irish could use to ‘unlock the gates of Ulster’ (i.e. facilitate a united Ireland), and this key was ‘loyalty to the British Empire.’​[76]​ Sinn Féin thought this speech sufficiently important to merit a special number of the Irish Bulletin dedicated to rebutting it. In its analysis, the government’s offer of ‘Dominion Home Rule’ was unacceptable because it would mean that Ireland would remain within the Empire: ‘if as Mr. Churchill suggests, a successful conference can only be one in which Ireland must surrender her national position and yield up her right to self-determination, no successful conference is possible.’​[77]​ 

Churchill and his fellow ministers got their way on this issue in the treaty negotiations that followed. This was crucial from their point of view, as they had to sell the agreement to the Lloyd George coalition’s (mainly Conservative) supporters in government. Tory opponents of the treaty cast it as a surrender to the anti-imperial conspiracy that Churchill and other ministers had previously identified, and were able to quote Sinn Féin’s boast that Ireland had ‘taken the strongest Empire by the throat and […] brought it to its knees.’​[78]​ Defending the treaty in the Commons, Churchill played up its benefits for the Empire, much on the lines that he had argued for Home Rule before the war. In a striking passage, he discussed the Irish diaspora, on the one hand casting it in a positive, Empire-building role, and on the other suggesting that it had helped poison intra-imperial relations. His use of familial imagery is particularly noteworthy given that, in 1918, he had described Ireland as ‘the sick and ailing child of the British Empire’.​[79]​

Ireland is not a daughter State. She is a parent nation. The Irish are an ancient race. […] They are intermingled with the whole life of the Empire, and have interests in every part of the Empire wherever the English language is spoken, especially in those new countries with whom we have to look forward to the greatest friendship and countenance, and where the Irish canker has been at work. 

Reconciling ‘the spirit of the Irish nation to the British Empire’, he argued, would bring major advantages, and this the treaty would likely do.​[80]​ Sir Lamar Worthington-Evans was one minister who echoed these themes: if the treaty was passed, ‘I hope and believe that the Irish may still be willing to share the glory and the burden of Empire.’ ​[81]​

Yet the more Churchill and his colleagues emphasised that a free Ireland would be tightly bound into the Empire, the more Irish critics of the treaty were provided with rhetorical opportunities of their own. This was seen during the debates about the treaty in the Dáil, in which (as at Westminster, but for different reasons) the proposed oath of allegiance to the Crown was a major point of contention. Constance Markievicz, for example, argued that ‘if we pledge ourselves to this oath we pledge our allegiance to this thing, whether you call it Empire or Commonwealth of Nations, that is treading down the people of Egypt and of India.’​[82]​ By contrast, Michael Collins argued that the treaty defined Ireland as having the same constitutional status of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, which had real solid independence.​[83]​ When, in the wake of their narrow victory in the Dáil, Collins’s pro-treaty-ites won the Free State general election, Churchill told the House of Commons that in his view the Irish people were saying to the British: ‘You have given us our freedom; we wish to give you our friendship. You will help us towards a united Ireland; we will help you towards a united Empire.’​[84]​ He continued to articulate his hope of a united Ireland even after the outbreak of the civil war; but he did not believe that Ulster should be coerced into such an arrangement and he continued to assume that a united Ireland would be ‘interwoven with the United British Empire.’​[85]​ 





In later years, Churchill continued to place considerable stress on the importance of the Free State remaining within the ambit of the Empire, although he also expressed relief that Sinn Féin members had kept away from Westminster after World War I, thus bolstering the Conservative forces in the Commons.​[87]​ In 1931, he sought to limit the Statute of Westminster - which recognised the Dominions as ‘autonomous Communities within the British Empire’ – insofar as it applied to Ireland. With de Valera’s Fianna Fáil on the verge of taking power in Dublin, Churchill feared that the Free State could use the legislation to repudiate the treaty, including the oath of allegiance. (Now at the early stages of his Indian campaign, he also predicted that a ‘frightful disaster’ would befall India if full Dominion status as set out in the statute were granted to it.)​[88]​ After Churchill spoke in this sense in the Commons, Leo Amery described his contribution as powerful and impressive; and yet, he said, ‘it was a speech which I feel was based upon a conception of the British Empire utterly different from that which I hold.’ Amery played on his own credentials as a Unionist who had opposed the treaty at the time. In spite of that, he said, ‘once we had set Ireland upon the footing of a Dominion, there was only one way to treat it, and that was like the other Dominions’. Britain should make it ‘worth Ireland’s while to be loyal’ and the nation should act boldly with a confidence ‘which will weld this Empire more closely together’.​[89]​ The amendment backed by Churchill was not successful. This was not solely, to be sure, as a result of Amery’s intervention. There was, however, a certain irony in Amery’s use in this context of a type of rhetoric that Churchill had himself often deployed in earlier years.

Churchill later claimed to have been vindicated, arguing that the de Valera had been able to use the Statute of Westminster to repudiate the treaty with complete legality. He also warned that the safeguards built into the National Government’s Indian reform legislation would in time be repudiated in turn.​[90]​ The adoption of the new Irish constitution in 1937 further accentuated Churchill’s hostility to the de Valera government. The following year, when attacking the Chamberlain government’s decision to return control of the Treaty Ports to the Irish, Churchill declared:

No doubt I shall be told about South Africa, Canada and Australia. The case of Ireland is not comparable with the Dominions. Southern Ireland is not a Dominion; it has never accepted that position. It is a State based upon a Treaty, which Treaty has been completely demolished. Southern Ireland, therefore, becomes a State which is an undefined and unclassified anomaly.

He explained why the comparison of Ireland with the Dominions was inapplicable: ‘The Dominions are far away. […] The Dominions are loyal. […] But here the danger is at our very door.’​[91]​ Pre-1914 opponents of Home Rule had deployed very similar arguments.​[92]​ These remarks undoubtedly contributed to his reputation, by 1940, as someone who ‘hates Ireland’ and who wanted to ‘drive Eire out of the Empire’.​[93]​

Nevertheless, as Prime Minister he reverted to his earlier (theoretical) support for Irish unity. In a minute of June 1940, Churchill wrote that ‘I could never be a party to the coercion of Ulster to join the Southern counties: but I am much in favour of their being persuaded. The key to this is de Valera showing some loyalty to Crown & Empire.’​[94]​ Although he must have known the scenario was unlikely, the sentiments were not vastly removed from those he had expressed publicly in the 1920s. At no point during the war, however, did he use such language to the Irish privately, nor did he use it in his public rhetoric, even at moments of maximum anger. There was, in short, not much of an imperial dimension to his vociferous public criticisms of Ireland’s neutrality, although in 1944 he did (without mentioning the country by name) describe Éire as a ‘lamentable exception’ to wartime imperial unity.​[95]​ Notoriously, in his May 1945 victory broadcast, he dwelt on how Britain, instead of seizing the treaty ports, had ‘left the De Valera government to frolic’ with German and Japanese representatives in Dublin. Yet although he praised ‘the loyalty and friendship of Northern Ireland’ he did not, in the course of this passage, mention the word ‘Empire’. Rather – in a trope familiar from Boer War days – he praised the ‘Irish heroes’ who had died on the British side.​[96]​ De Valera’s quiet and considered reply did not mention ‘Empire’ either.​[97]​





In advance of his return to power, Churchill continued to pay lip service to Irish unity in private and even expressed a sentimental preference for Southern Ireland over Ulster.​[100]​ During the 1951 general election, however, he recorded a message to be played at meetings of Ulster Unionist candidates in which he affirmed his determination that ‘the present relationship between Ulster and the United Kingdom and Empire’ would not be altered without the consent of the Stormont parliament.​[101]​ In terms of Irish affairs, his final premiership was notable only for his first and only direct encounter with de Valera, who was now in power once more. The occasion was surprisingly cordial but led to no diplomatic breakthrough. When de Valera raised the question of Irish unification, Churchill pointed out the obstacle posed by Ulster and Conservative Party opinion.​[102]​ With the Republic an established fact there was at any rate little further scope for Churchill or anyone else to talk positively about Ireland in imperial language. (This was again made clear in a speech Churchill made after his retirement, when receiving, at a ceremony in London, the freedom of two Ulster cities.)​[103]​ Even within Northern Irish politics, the Empire card did not play equally well everywhere – rural areas were apparently more receptive to it than urban ones.​[104]​ If, to use Thompson’s analogy, the term ‘Empire’ was repeatedly filled up and emptied of its meaning, then there did at last come a point where refilling it no longer served a valuable political function. In the case of Churchill and Ireland, the 1930s marked a clear decline in his use of imperial language; his reversion to it in 1948 was somewhat exceptional. Seemingly, it was Fianna Fáil’s decision to make ‘scrap-iron’ (as Churchill put it) of the Anglo-Irish treaty, rather than the subsequent de jure creation of the Republic, that triggered this rhetorical shift.​[105]​ His differing statements over the years, however, meant that his views remained a point of contestation in the rhetoric of others. In the Stormont parliament in 1953, the veteran nationalist Cahir Healy insisted that, although Churchill was now a prisoner of the Tory Party on the Irish issue, his 1912 Belfast speech represented his true opinion: ‘If he were to declare his mind to-day he would want a united and free Ireland.’ The Prime Minister, Viscount Brookeborough, counteracted with Churchill’s views as expressed in 1948, and another member suggested that in 1912 Churchill had been ‘young and uneducated’.​[106]​

It may well be said, of course, that Churchill merely adjusted his language to suit the new realities of Britain’s relationship with Ireland. If so, however, the fact that he did so is in itself noteworthy. In other contexts, he talked unapologetically about the benefits of ‘British imperialism’ much beyond the point that ‘Commonwealth’ had supplanted ‘Empire’ in common usage by his fellow politicians.​[107]​ The suggestion that he retained a ‘Victorian’ imperial mentality was made by numerous contemporaries and has been echoed by historians, including by some sympathetic to Churchill; he himself seemed to revel in the idea.​[108]​ Yet in the case of Ireland, Churchill showed considerable rhetorical flexibility. The standard line of Victorian (and later) Unionists, that Home Rule posed a mortal danger to the Empire, was one that he used early in his career but then dropped. He then argued across a sustained period that Home Rule would strengthen the Empire by increasing the loyalty of Ireland’s people. He did not endorse Lord Randolph’s dictum in its original sense but reversed its meaning; and he also suggested that the threatened Ulster rebellion, were it not faced down, threatened the eclipse of the central imperial government. His language became quite lurid during the Anglo-Irish War, but his arguments in favour of the subsequent treaty were similar to those that he had used on behalf of Home Rule prior to 1914; the difference was that he no longer raised any doubts about Ulster’s fundamental loyalty. His subsequent gestures in the direction of Irish unification were the rhetorical quid pro quo for his non-negotiable support for the consent principle in Northern Ireland. In the debates on the Statute of Westminster, he found his own former arguments turned against him; and if in the 1930s he showed some tendency to revert to the themes of his youth, the statements of his final years cannot be easily read as the simple product of Victorian die-hard-ism.​[109]​

Some themes, however, did crop up repeatedly throughout the years. The first of these was Churchill’s references to the bravery of Irish soldiers in British conflicts. The implication was that, much as some nationalists might criticize the Empire, they were not fully representative of an Ireland that was prepared to send its sons into battle on Britain’s behalf. This suggestion that Irish anti-imperialism was a marginal tendency served different functions at different times. During the Boer War, Churchill used it to reproach the Nationalist Party. In Belfast in 1912 he used it to back up his claim that the Irish and their leaders had a fundamental capacity for loyalty. Later still, he again used it as a reproach to de Valera for Ireland’s neutrality, although by this point the imperial context was left in the background.

The second recurring theme was Churchill’s emphasis on the imperial spirit which it was the role of policy to foster and encourage. The Crown’s place as ‘the magic link’ that united the Empire-Commonwealth was the symbol of this approach.​[110]​ Its advantage, from the rhetorical point of view, was its extreme malleability; it could be invoked as a balm that, with sufficient time and goodwill, could soothe away apparently intractable difficulties. Once the people of Southern Ireland were relieved of their grievances, he frequently suggested, their national spirit could be reconciled to the Empire; as the old animosities died away, so hearts would meet across the border and partition would dissolve in a fog of mutual benevolence. ‘Empire’ in this context was not intended to have a connotation of domination; rather, it was a call to sink sectarian differences in the interests of the common good. Churchill, of course, presented the common good in such a way as to acknowledge no possibility of divergence between the interests of Britain and those of Ireland. And he did indeed treat the needs of the Empire as though they were an unquestionable moral principle.
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